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Introduction
Counterfeit products consumption is a global problem that has grown significantly with the dilution of national boundaries and barriers resulting from common economic/trade agreements, the communicative reach of the Internet and modern copying technologies. Counterfeit consumption is estimated to account for US$450 billion of retail revenue each year (AGMA, 2004; Miyazaki, 2004) .
Statistics from anti-counterfeiting organisations show that global piracy has no obvious product category limitations and that almost every industry has been affected. Counterfeit goods' consumption is almost regarded as normal in many territories.
To date, previous research in this area has largely emphasised the supply side issues from a genuine manufacturer's perspective only, focusing upon those product classes most vulnerable to illicit reproduction, together with associated anti-counterfeiting strategies and technological developments employed in combating IPR theft (i.e. Chow, 2003; McDonald & Roberts, 1994; Olsen & Granzin, 1992) .
Similarly, the existing literature on counterfeit consumption has mainly investigated the characteristics and motivations of consumers toward counterfeit goods, along with associated demographic variables, psychographic factors and their socioeconomic contexts (i.e. Prendergast, Chue, & Phau, 2002; Tom, Garibaldi, Zeng, & Pilcher, 1998; Wee, Ta, & Cheok, 1995) .
Various anti-counterfeiting measures and strategies based on these perspectives have been proposed and implemented, including international treaties and enforcement of intellectual property rights to prosecute counterfeiters, use of multiple labelling and packaging techniques to make counterfeiting more difficult, consumer education via warnings and advertising campaigns, tight control of retail stores, and consultations with both government agencies and other industry stakeholders and manufacturers. Despite such efforts, however, these strategies designed to eradicate counterfeiting activities do not seem to have worked well as piracy continues to thrive around the world. It seems to leave too many questions unanswered.
Retailers are often blamed for the proliferation of counterfeits as evidenced by the literature. Strategies thus are targeted mainly on how law enforcement can help eradicate counterfeit practices. However, many perceive the selling of counterfeits as a price discrimination, risk-related and cost free activity, and such counterfeit retailers rarely go out of business (Chow, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2004) . Research indicates that counterfeits keep selling at far beyond the product lifecycles of genuine merchandise.
Counterfeit buyers and sellers, in fact, appear actively and consciously "working together" to construct an increasingly diverse array of physical and virtual marketplaces in which procurement activities may be undertaken, sale of counterfeit goods as a deceptive activity being very much in the minority in comparison to those circumstances in which consumers actively seek and select a "pirate" purchase option. So the questions remain: Who is most responsible for the proliferation of counterfeit goods -the counterfeit retailers or the counterfeit-prone consumers in a non-deceptive counterfeit market? Apart from obvious price benefits, how do counterfeit retailers approach marketing mix variables to promote their unique selling proposition and compete with other counterfeit retailers?
The willingness of legitimate originations in their motivation to combat counterfeits is also now being questioned. Olsen & Granzin (1992) and Chow (2000; found that retailers would accept the responsibility in fighting counterfeits only if government and manufacturers share the obligation. If they feel that it is a trivial problem, they will neither share the responsibilities nor support the manufacturers and the governmental authorities. Law enforcement targeted at counterfeit retailers may not solve the entire problem either. The root of the problem stems from the persistent willingness of consumers to purchase counterfeits, and the often robust relationship between buyer and seller, together with the conflicting interests between government authorities, counterfeit and authorised retailers in a competitive business market. This calls for an investigation of how retailers are responding to law enforcement strategies, as well as the functioning of the relationships between consumers, counterfeit retailers, and authorised retailers. Further, due to the fact that counterfeiting is basically an illegitimate business enterprise, an understanding of the marketing activities involving fake merchandise may also contribute to a better understanding of legitimate channels of marketing and communicative strategies.
Although the existing literature discusses how counterfeit marketing can arise, no theoretical framework has yet been proposed, nor used to analyse counterfeit marketing activities. Neither does the literature analyse the marketing activities of counterfeit retailers or the interactive relationships between counterfeit retailers and buyers, together with other key actors. It is thus important to obtain a descriptive understanding of the problem; there is also a need to better understand both the marketing function and the context of counterfeit marketplaces. For these reasons, the author here use the Marketing Firm theoretical framework and relationship marketing concepts to analyse the behaviours of key actors within the non-deceptive counterfeit marketplace.
The study detailed in this paper depicts the reality of complex bilaterally contingent phenomena and introduces its theoretical implications via the use of qualitative research methods. The paper is divided into four parts. In the first section, a conceptual model using operant learning concepts is proposed to aid marketers in understanding the activities of counterfeit retailers and the interactions amongst all key actors in counterfeit marketing. As counterfeit marketing involves multiple parties' economic exchange behaviours, the use of the Marketing Firm conceptual approach, derived from operant theory, is therefore deemed appropriate (Foxall, 1998) . The author adapt and extend Foxall's model of the Marketing Firm to represent the situation as a managerial response to an external competitive environment in which the counterfeit retailer is bilaterally contingent upon consumer behaviours (such as consumer high demand and purchasing behaviours) and/or the orthodox stakeholders' marketing activities (such as advertising, promotional efforts, and anti-counterfeiting strategies). All parties in the counterfeit marketplace try to predict and control the behaviour of others.
Each party enters this relationship only because it maximises their economic benefits, reduces transaction costs, and they remain in it for only as long as it reduces transaction costs. This conceptual model provides a formal framework with which marketers can precisely identify and examine the managerial and policy implications of counterfeit marketing.
Following the formulation of the theoretical framework, the second section of the paper explains the need to adopt embedded theory and a research design based on the comparison of multiple cases (Yin, 2003) . Following the case approach, this study gathered various sources of qualitative data, and analysed them by comparing different reciprocally reinforcing relationships and networks using the embedded theory approach. Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting both the conceptual and practical implications of the data and outlining potential marketing implications.
Literature Review
The Marketing Firm (Foxall, 1998) is a model of the manner in which a business entity (individual entrepreneurs, SMEs, large multinationals) operates to influence consumer behaviour under particular economic-structural conditions, those which induce consumer-orientated management by the business as a whole. The effective Marketing Firm capitalises upon the instrumental nature of the consumer's behaviour to manipulate a variety of cues that are present during a buying episode, promoting acquisition of the goods on offer by maximising positive outcomes and minimising aversive consequences. More specifically, the marketing firm model locates the firm's behaviour at the situational interaction with consumer behaviours and their positive/aversive outcomes, the actions of the latter upon the former serving to identify those cues that may reliably signal the likely consequences of available marketing strategy options. Put another way, firms routinely shape their behaviours in the marketplace in response to the aggregate behaviour patterns of consumers themselves. If a particular marketing strategy is effective at the macro, monadic and/or tactical levels, the firm will repeat or enhance that marketing strategy. In operant terms, the behaviour of the customer thus constitutes a form of discriminative stimulus (S D s) within the firm's behaviour setting, performance metrics of purchase or non-purchase serving as sources of positive reinforcement and/or aversive consequences for the marketers; a mutually interdependent relationship as embodied within the concept of the bilateral contingency itself, as shown in Figure 1 . It is a conceptual stance that directs attention firmly toward the interaction between consumers' and marketing firms' behaviours at the micro level, rather than the macro-level.
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As Figure 1 shows, consumer purchasing behaviour is preceded by a discriminative stimulus, provided as a consequence of the marketing firm's behaviour. The behaviour of the consumer has consequences which are proximal causes of further action by the marketing firm. As previous research of consumer choice has suggested (e.g. Foxall, 1990; e.g. Foxall, 1993; Hackett & Foxall, 1997; Leek, Maddock, & Foxall, 1998; Oliveira-Castro, Ferreira, Foxall, & Schrezenmaier, 2005) , discriminatory stimuli within the retail behaviour setting (S D ), subject to their interaction with an individual's unique leaning history of encounters with identical/similar behaviour settings in the past, serve as signals that shape the consumer's response to a product and/or service (Rc), and that response in turn duly delivers positively or aversively reinforcing consequences (S R/A ); an operant process that is concurrent with the classic Skinnerian three-term contingency (Skinner, 1969) .
At the same time, however, the marketing activities of the firm also constitute operant behaviours in themselves; behaviours which equally conform to the three-term contingency in a manner that is contingent upon the behavioural responses of the firms' customers, as described above. That is, the behaviour of consumers in the marketplace forms part of the competitive environment (i.e. the behaviour setting) within which the firm operates, and thus constitutes a form of discriminative stimulus (S D ). Depending upon those customer responses, the firm will engage in a series of marketing activities (Rm) that will in turn be either positively or aversively reinforced by subsequent consumer responses to those marketing activities (S R/A ). As illustrated by the two broken lines in Figure 1 , the behaviours of marketer and consumer are thus interdependent, i.e. bilaterally contingent upon one other.
Consumer behaviour is a component of the firm's behaviour setting, marketing activities being reciprocal behaviours that are directed towards influencing the behaviour setting of the consumer in order to seek to elicit the behavioural response that is the customer's purchase of that firm's goods/services. Put another way, marketing is a behaviour the firm engages in as a way of both influencing and responding to the behaviour of its customers. Conversely, buying is a response to, and trigger for, marketing actions from the firm.
The nature of the marketer-customer relationship thus becomes clear, together with the implications of that relationship for strategic marketing management. The goal of the retail organisation is to predict and control the behaviour of its consumers in such a manner that the firm maximises positive reinforcement (e.g. profit making) and/or minimises negative consequences (e.g. costs) of its market activities, as measured by the extent to which consumers acquire and use, consume and dispose of, the firms' market offering.
In fact, it is more than a simply an exchange between firms and consumers, as manifest in much of the relationship marketing literature. Other actors play prominent roles in the exchange networks also, either directly or indirectly, from the actions of governments seeking to regulate this exchange, through to the behaviours of competitors. A similar pattern of contingencies exists when two rival firms, or between a customer and a supplier, and both entities are therefore actively and deliberately involved in behaviour setting and reinforcer management.
The basis of the bilateral contingency is the mutual closure of the parties' behaviour setting scopes. To illustrate this, consider the problem of marketing firms' competition within orthodox purchasing contexts. Many other firms may well be vying for the patronage of the individual consumer in any buying situation, a number of actors possibly attempting to procure business through their own market behaviours; i.e. there are other firms seeking to "close" a consumer's behaviour setting at any given moment in time, each engaging in their own marketing behaviours. A supermarket such as
Tesco, for instance, may engage in marketing activities emphasising price and value in an attempt to influence the grocery buyer. In response to this, or perhaps as an antecedent to Tesco's actions, a rival firm such as Sainsbury may develop a competing marketing strategy that emphasises quality and choice in respect of produce range. Ultimately, the two retailers are vying for the patronage of the individual consumer. At a strategic level, however, many of their marketing behaviours may in reality be stimulated by the behaviour of their rivals; i.e. Firm A takes this action in the marketplace, so Firm B responds in this particular way. One firm's behaviour is a component of the other firm's competitive behaviour setting, and vice versa. In short, the two firms' marketing behaviours are also bilaterally contingent.
Of course, the competitive environment of the retail firm is rarely an entirely open one. Indeed, many of the marketing behaviours that retailers may engage in are in themselves enabled and constrained by both the dynamics of the market economy itself and, more importantly perhaps within the context of this paper, by the regulatory environment generated by legislators and other parties. Thus, the behaviour of the Government, for instance, may influence the behaviour of retailers or -particularly in instances where legislation is a direct consequence of retailer abuse of power -Government behaviour may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the marketplace.
The study which follows applies empirical approach to examine different types of bilaterally contingent relationships in a counterfeit marketplace, thereby relating the interactive behaviour patterns that may result in derived reinforcement of counterfeit consumption. The interactive behavioural network produced shows the necessary conditions which collectively have an impact on the competitive interactions between all parties involved. The result of such interactions has an impact on counterfeit goods consumption, either in the scope of the behaviour setting or the availability of anticipated exchange reinforcement.
Methodology

Context and phenomena
This study applies the case method and selects the counterfeit retailing industry in China as the research context to illustrate the marketing behaviours and bilaterally contingent relationships of key actors. The data used in this research were gathered from multiple sources. Besides interviewing counterfeit retailers, interviews were also conducted with counterfeit buyers, authorised retailers/manufacturers, and staff from legislatures and anti-counterfeiting agencies. Secondary data were also collected, including corporate reports of legitimate manufacturers/retailers and materials published by anti-counterfeiting agencies, as well as regulations, speeches/statements from international governmental organisations. Furthermore, mainstream and business press coverage of counterfeiting issues, together with more unorthodox sources such as "chat room" and "Web blog"
discussions by consumers and the counterfeiters themselves, were also examined. Data collected from multiple sources in this way help enhance the completion and validity of the qualitative data.
In order to investigate the counterfeit retailer's marketing behaviour and the bilaterally contingent relationships at work in the marketplace, this study purposively chose the counterfeit retailers of the wholesale centres in China as a research focus because China remains one of the world's largest producers of, and markets for, counterfeit goods since the early 1990s after the success of 'marketorientated' reforms (Wenhai, 2004) . Non-deceptive counterfeiting is now a common marketing phenomenon in retail areas where goods are purveyed in luxurious boutiques (SAIC, 2002; BBC, 2003; Porteous, 2001; Yao, 2005) . It is possible to procure counterfeit copies of those goods in lesser stores, local wholesale markets and from street vendors, a co-existent relationship in which the marketing of the former almost serves to 'feed' the latter, and vice-versa. The counterfeit industry in China is an omnipresent economic phenomenon over products crossing the whole country (Chow, 2003) . The non-deceptive counterfeit retailing industry in China consists of counterfeit producers, subcontracted manufacturers, counterfeit retailers, third parties such as local governments, private business-dominated wholesale centres, and counterfeit consumers, which is itself illustrative of the rich exchange features of a network market.
Therefore, the theoretical dimensions of this study can be illustrated by investigating multiple bilateral exchange relationships within the counterfeit marketplaces of China.
Moreover, given China appears to be one of the most developed counterfeit marketplaces in the world, it holds a number of key advantages in terms of its suitability as a context for this research. Firstly, in terms of access to counterfeit retailers and consumers, the near ubiquity of counterfeit goods and their acceptance as a "normal" aspect of business and shopping renders this a location in which securing cooperation would be far easier than in, say, the UK where the counterfeiting problem retains more overtly illicit in character and consumers may, as a result, be less open about their buying habits. In particular, it is easier to obtain the data and information from the counterfeit retailers in China.
Secondly, and related to this, the rapid rise in counterfeit purchasing in Europe in recent years means that this behaviour still has a degree of "novelty" value. As a consequence, consumer buying and firms' selling patterns may be less stable and more erratic than in a more established market context such as China, making data analysis more problematic.
This work analysed key actors' marketing behaviours, and the bilaterally contingent marketing relationships between counterfeit buyers, authorised retailers, counterfeit retailers and third parties such as local governments, who populate the competitive environment of this complex and multifaceted commercial arena, illustrated in Figure 2 . Ultimately, the objective was to understand the extent to which the dynamic inter-relationships between these key actors have a significant impact on the counterfeiting consumption which serve to shape consumer response to illegitimate products and services.
As Figure 2 shows, there were potentially four key bilaterally contingent relationships (R1, R2, R3, and R4)) to examine; between counterfeit retailers, authorised marketing firms, and third parties to the consumer. Each key actor's behaviour may influence the behaviour of the other three actors -the behaviour of each actor may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the marketplace, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
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The investigation conducted an in-depth inquiry of the market behaviours of counterfeit retailers, authorised retailers, third parties (local governments) and consumers, together with the relationships and networks between key actors in the counterfeit marketplace in China. It was necessary to clearly define separate bilateral interaction behaviours, each predicted and controlled by discriminative stimuli and the consequences of behaviours of key actors as units of analysis (or focal bilateral relationships). Based on the actual structure of counterfeit marketing as illustrated in Fig 2, four key actors' behaviours and four key hypothetical bilaterally contingent marketing relationships around consumers were selected as study samples.
To study interdependently reinforcing behaviour dynamics in the counterfeit marketing, this investigation adopted the case study method of Yin (1994) as a basic research approach. Additionally, the work applied multiple case comparisons using the embedded theory framework, also proposed by Yin (1994) , as its main research strategy.
Research analysis and findings
The study chose four key actors' marketing behaviours and four key relationships as research populations. Each focal bilaterally contingent relationship and its associated effects will be discussed individually later. Table 1 illustrates the analytical results of four key actors' behaviours in an operant terms, including interdependent actors, discriminative stimuli, marketing responses and activities, and reinforcement of the marketing behaviours. The analytical results include focal bilaterally contingency relationships and related reciprocally reinforcing effects, the scope of behaviour settings, and the impact of the reinforcement of relational exchanges on proceeding interactions, listed in Table   2 . Moreover, Table 3 illustrates the analytical mechanism for the construction of a generic bilateral contingency network model.
4.1
The Behavioural analysis of counterfeit retailers, authorised retailers, third parties, and consumers (Table 1) Regarding the Stimuli-Response-Reinforcement paradigm and the Marketing Firm theory, some research findings are illustrated below:
(1) Buyer behaviour patterns appear to function as an operant process in the counterfeit marketplace.
Consumer acquisition of counterfeit products is significantly associated with particular behaviour setting variables, direct/indirect experiences of counterfeit goods, the positive reinforcement retailers provide, and consumer expectations. That is, the exchange benefits offered by a counterfeit retailer (stimulus) influence the positive outcomes expected by the purchaser (2) Counterfeit retailers' behaviour patterns also lie in the S d -R-S r/a paradigm. Like orthodox marketing firms, most counterfeit retailers do their business in legitimate and private wholesale centres, administrated by the local Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC). In those centres, counterfeit retailers are actually legitimate firms. The products that the counterfeit retailers sell not only include well-known branded "A", "B" grade and "grey market" counterfeits, but also include genuine unknown branded and local branded goods. Under such market conditions, counterfeit retailers do appear to have the same "marketing mix" strategies functioning as any other legitimate marketing firm, but normally at a lower cost. Most sellers of counterfeit products have complete policies for exchange, replacement or refund, for instance, to ensure they follow the regulations of the wholesale centres and provide consumer satisfaction. It is also worth noting that counterfeit retailers do have their own "pseudo-brands" within this industry, the know-how technology to produce them, the promotional means to advertise effectively (word of mouth, direct salespeople to promote goods outside and inside the market), and their own distributors delivering goods to different customer segments, and with different segment-specific levels of pricing.
These market entry conditions, such as no or few market barriers and high demand for known branded products (stimuli), may influence counterfeit retailers' expected maximisation of rewards (reinforcement), which influences those counterfeit retailers' continuous selling behaviours and their stay in the market (response) with other actors.
Adoption of the counterfeit products selling option is undoubtedly determined by the buoyant demand that satisfies one level of consumer needs at a premium price, offering positive reinforcement to the buyer (delivering value). Consumer behaviour in the marketplace (RC) therefore is a setting-level variable (S D ) for counterfeit retailers, guiding their marketing behaviours.
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In addition, the counterfeit retailers' marketing behaviour and production capacity relies heavily upon genuine brand owners and/or manufacturers because counterfeit products are unauthorised copies of goods whose manufacturers/retailers bear the bulk of the marketing costs. The and their customers are achieved by manipulating the discriminative stimuli present when consumer is in a shopping environment in order to increase the probability that a consummatory response will be emitted (e.g. Gronroos, 1994; Hunt, 1983; Johnson & Selnes, 2004; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Payne, 1995) . Manipulation of the cues present during a buying episode by a marketing firm will alter the likelihood of a purchase response, those cues setting the occasion for such responses.
That is, an authorised company's marketing behaviour (RLM) is therefore a setting-level variable On the other hand, third parties also control the authorised retailers' marketplace. The department stores and luxury boutiques are administrated by third parties. They have an obligation to protect the legitimate company's benefits, providing a sounder investable environment for well-known branded marketing firms in order to increase the investment for developing local economies.
Therefore, the financial, physical, social and economic structural setting (stimulus) offered by authorised retailers influences third parties' anticipated rewards such as development of local economies, a particular public image(reinforcement), which influences third parties must protect authorised retailers' benefit (response) as well. As with consumers, the capability to engage in consumption, as well as stable economic and social settings offered by the consumers (stimuli), influences third parties' positive outcomes (reinforcement), which in turn influences the third parties' protection of consumers (response).
Given the nature of counterfeiting, a behaviour infringing intellectual properties in general, third parties such as local government are a key actor in this level of marketing relationship, directly or indirectly mediating all other actors' behaviour setting variables and they are mutually reinforced by other actors'. That is, the legislature is a mechanism for closing the behaviour settings of all parties in mutually acceptable ways, which it does not only by economising transaction costs but by increasing the surplus of revenues over all costs including those of open market transactions. In this case, the third parties' regulation of counterfeiting (RL) is an S D for both authorised and counterfeit retailers. RL also determines S R/A of the third parties of local government which means that legislatures are actively and deliberately involved in the manipulation of counterfeit and authorised retailers' setting scopes and in reinforcement manipulation, as shown in the Figure 5 below.
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As indicated above, the cycle of bilaterally contingent relationships between third parties and counterfeit and authorised retailers mutually and reciprocally rely upon one another. The behaviour of third parties may influence the behaviour of counterfeit and authorised retailers or, particularly in cases where legislation is a direct consequence of retailer (either legitimate or counterfeiters) abuse of power, the behaviour of legislatures may be contingent upon the behaviour of the firm(s) within the marketplace. Table 2 )
Bilateral contingency relationships between counterfeit retailers and consumers (See
In order to understand how the interaction of all key actors occurs, what content of literal exchange reinforcement they obtain and what the scope of the behaviour setting each actor is in, it is necessary to further consider the bilaterally contingent relationship between all key actors in some detail. As analysed above, counterfeit retailers sell both counterfeits and un-known branded goods in the market.
They are regulated by third parties (such as AIC) as a legitimate firm in a wholesale centre. Regarding the bilateral contingency exchange relationships between counterfeit retailers and consumers, some research findings are illustrated below:
(1) Exchange reinforcers (value) between counterfeit retailers and consumers lie in acquiring highfashion and pre-release goods (big range of well-known branded clothes, shoes, accessories; unknown branded fashion goods, DVDs and software), fashion knowledge and trends, bargain experiences, after-sales service, lower prices, organised markets and profits, credits, customer loyalty etc. These reinforcers between other parties could positively or negatively affect the success of the exchanges. Firstly, the positive effects of consumer purchases for counterfeit retailers are that third parties (e.g. AIC) assure the quality and service of both counterfeits and non-counterfeits, while the negative effects are that third parties limit the size and style of the outlets in the marketplace, and determine the kind of marketing firm (self-employed entrepreneurs) that can enter in this marketplace. This negatively reinforces the decreasing of selling of counterfeit products because of the high rents in the wholesale market. Secondly, due to the fact that counterfeit goods are copies of genuine articles, the negative consequences also include those anti-counterfeiting strategies aimed at limiting counterfeit goods in the longer term and offering stability to consumers. Thirdly, the legitimate entities' premium price system and latest product information ensure that counterfeit retailers' price advantage and fashion trends always attract many consumers into the market. Finally, the negative effect to the counterfeit retailers is that authorised retailers always control consumer and counterfeit retailer's products resources because of the nature of counterfeits as copies.
(2) The fact that counterfeit retailers directly or indirectly manage the consumer behaviour setting from relatively open to relatively close can be observed in all of the reciprocal reinforcements as shown in Tables 1&2.   ( 3) The reciprocally reinforcing relationship between consumers and counterfeit retailers is influenced by the interactions between authorised retailers and consumers, and between counterfeit retailers and third parities (such as local government). Additionally, the focal relationship is influenced by the effects derived from either or both inter-actors and creates a bilateral circuit-type of network. Both parties involved in the focal exchange are influenced by the overspreading relationships, and besides the interaction between the related actors, there is an extensive level of spreading influence of reciprocally reinforcing behaviour.
The focal relationship forms a bilaterally overspreading relationship system, comprising a loop-like circuit network. Table 2 )
Bilateral contingency relationships between authorised retailers and consumers (See
Before authorised retailers enter the wholesale market, they must register what branded goods will be provided in that market with the AIC. To ensure the quality of the products provided to consumers, third parties such as the AIC regularly assess goods sold, auditing the content of the products (such as DVD film) and services provided by the authorised retailers. Regarding the reciprocally reinforcing relationships derived between authorised retailers and consumers, some research findings are illustrated below:
(1) The interactive relationship between authorised retailers and consumers originates from professional customer-oriented marketing services and products provided by the authorised retailers and orthodox distributors to consumers, relatively ensured quality product, social status value and customer loyalty, credits for services, and the high economic value of income provided by consumers to the authorised retailers.
(2) The third parties' evaluation for quality of the product, licensing of products, brand registrations, The exchange relationships between third parties and counterfeit retailers, which are external to the focal bilateral relationship (authorised retailers vs consumers), the additional separate influences of third parties with authorised retailers, and of counterfeit retailers with consumers, eventually influence the exchange reinforcers of authorised retailers with consumers. This focal relationship, with its compound overspreading relationships, forms a bilateral circuit-type network. Table 2) As mentioned above, third parties include the local AIC, tax department, and other regulatory bodies.
Bilateral contingency relationships between the third parties and consumers (See
Third parties represent the governmental authorities and have an obligation to protect consumers' benefits and welfare while developing the local economy. However, conflicts occur when consumers and marketing firms fight over access to limited product resources. Findings regarding the derived reciprocally-reinforcing relationships between consumers and third parties are illustrated below:
(1) Reinforcing activities of consumers with third parties include offering the increasing capability of consumption and credits for protection to third parties, while third parties provide an organised and regulated marketplace to ensure the consumers' welfare by virtue of their authority over counterfeit and authorised retailers.
(2) The fact that third parties directly or indirectly manage consumers' behaviour settings from relatively open to relatively closed were observed in all the exchange values shown in Tables 1&2.   ( 3) The interaction between consumers and the legitimate entities is positively and negatively influenced by competition among counterfeit and authorised retailers in terms of after-sales service, range of products, taxes, administration fees, etc.
(4) The interactions between consumer and authorised retailers positively influence the interactions between third parties and consumers. Similarly, the interactions between counterfeit retailers and consumers also positively and negatively affect the interactions of third parties and consumers.
The reciprocally reinforcing relationship between consumers and third parties is influenced by the other reciprocally reinforcing relationships between counterfeit and authorised retailers and between retailers and third parties. This focal relationship creates a bilateral overspreading relationship system comprising a triangular circuit network.
4.5 Bilateral contingency relationships between counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers (Table   2) As mentioned before, third parties directly control or administer both counterfeit and authorised retailers. Compared to authorised retailers, counterfeit retailers enjoy more tax discounts and lower R&D costs (or even no R&D) and direct advertising cost, because the authorised retailers must follow all the market regulations and audit systems. Counterfeit retailers in this market are small entrepreneurs who benefit from the governmental preference policy aimed at easing unemployment problems and facilitating local protectionism. Moreover, unlike authorised retailers, counterfeit retailers' purchase procedures are more flexible because of the size of the companies involved. In particular, counterfeit retailers' competitive advantage lies in the authorised retailer's products in terms of advertising and R&D costs, which gives them a unique competitive market position.
Regarding the derived interactive relationships between the counterfeit retailers and the authorised retailers, the research findings were as follows:
(1) The interactively reinforcing relationship between counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers lies in the customers' product knowledge transfer, and the patronage of consumers switching from one to another, the user-based market share, and the economic value of mutual support.
(2) The fact that third parties directly or indirectly manage the consumer' behaviour setting from relatively open to relatively closed was observed in all the exchange reinforcers, as shown in Tables 1&2.   ( 3) The reinforcers exchanged between the counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers are influenced by third parties. The third parties influence this relationship through separate relationships with either/both of them.
(4) The reinforcers exchanged between counterfeit and authorised retailers are also influenced by consumer purchase patterns and by the user-based knowledge transfer achieved via its separate relationships with either/both of them.
(5) The interactions between third parties and counterfeit retailers are more complex and in paradox;
on the negative side, they restrict the free market mechanism because of the complexity of policy regulation and anti-counterfeiting requirements from outside, but on the other hand, they also guarantee the market competition advantage of counterfeit retailers over authorised retailers, in case the authorised retailers of well-known branded enter into the market due to protection of local and national branded products. This has an influence on the authorised retailers' exchange reinforcers with counterfeit retailers. There is evidence to show that authorised retailers use or merge the distribution channels of counterfeit retailers as a strategy to enlarge market share in the new market or as a market entry strategy.
(6) The interaction between third parties and authorised retailers can negatively influence counterfeit selling activities because of regulations, IPR laws and international agreements with counterfeit and authorised retailers, which ensure the market economic order is consistent with the international marketplace.
The focal relationship between counterfeit and authorise retailers result in a bilateral circuit-type network.
Propositions and Conclusions
Based on the preceding analysis of the complex reinforcing relationships between key actors involved in the counterfeit consumption process as it operates in the wholesale centres of China, four actors and four types of exchange network of bilateral relationships have been found. According to the discovery from field data, the author offers the following propositions and insights, which can represent theoretical and empirical implications as follows:
Proposition 1. The behaviour of marketing firms in the counterfeit marketplace involves the management of the reinforcement and scope of behaviour settings of the other parties. Reinforcement includes positive economic utilitarian reinforcement, social benefits, knowledge benefits, technical benefits, as well as negative reinforcement effects also (transaction costs, risk, etc).
According to Foxall (1999) , all mutual social or economic interactions involve reciprocal reinforcement.
Much of what marketing firms do, whether authorised or unauthorised, is thus directed towards changing the reinforcing and/or aversive properties of attributes of their products and brands so as to make them more attractive to consumers. They attempt to accomplish this by creating, modifying and/or promoting brands and products in the marketplace. Such manipulations of the cues present during a buying episode will alter the likelihood of a purchase response due to those cues setting the occasion for such responses. Within a counterfeiting context, the counterfeit retailer as a "bad competitor" has the same marketing functions in the competitive environment, which include managing reinforcers and closing the behaviour settings of consumers in a semi-legitimate format. For example, the economic values and the available counterfeit market offered by a counterfeit retailer (stimulus) influence customers' expected positive reinforcers, such as social benefits, economic benefits, etc (reinforcement), which in turn significantly influence customer loyalty toward the counterfeit retailers (response).
On the other hand, the counterfeit retailer's behaviour is also managed and affected by other actors. Foxall (1999) believes that a reciprocally reinforcing relationship exists between marketing firms and consumers, achieved through swapping or trading entities that could include economical, technical, knowledge, consulting and social benefits recognised by both parties (Kathandarama & Wilson, 2001) . This reciprocally reinforcing relationship should involve matters that are perceived as important reinforcement input by the other party and can be obtained for, and measured by, monetary or literal exchanges. In the counterfeit market, the content of exchange is particular in this case, which includes economic utilitarian reinforcement; for example, the counterfeit retailer provides various well-known branded products at a fractional price in an organised wholesale market in order to obtain high profits and marketing performance through a high-volume low-cost strategy. The consumer also obtains economic utilitarian benefit from counterfeit retailers. The exchange content here includes social benefits such as mutual reinforcement (protection and high rent and/or tax) between third parties and counterfeit retailers as a means of resolving unemployment issues. Whilst between counterfeit and authorized retailers, the exchange content include fashion and technical knowledge transfer from each other through consumer switch behaviour. The analysis in this study demonstrates that some reciprocally reinforcing behaviour exist in an interaction network in the counterfeit industry in China.
Proposition 3. Previous reciprocally reinforcing behaviours can affect either or both focal bilateral exchangers. Therefore, the derived effect can have a bilateral impact. Bagozzi (1975) and Webster (1992) perceive a highly developed exchange relationship as a linkage of dyadic exchanges. Along with the extensive linkage of the related reinforcing behaviour of one or both interactors, a network exchange system is established by all of the related behaviours. Marketing theory traditionally views dyadic exchange as a core activity of marketing behaviours (Kotler, 2000) which should be explored using the marketing firm theory and the network perspective. Accordingly, the network of exchange behaviours interact with one another, thus forming an internally-dynamic exchange system based on the bilateral contingency approach.
Proposition 4. Transfer relationships of focal exchange reinforcers may affect one another. Hence, the relationships of derived reinforcement effects can be of a bilateral-circuit type.
In a network exchange system, any dyadic exchange reinforcer influences, or is influenced by, the inbound related exchange reinforcement and the scope of the behaviour setting. That is, the exchange reinforcement shifts with network linkages. This network may be a circuit system when the shift reinforcement forms a closed loop, otherwise it is an open system. The reinforcement shift in circuit systems stimulates the original exchange relationship because of the reinforcement linkage cycle.
Conversely, an open system can only create discrete reinforcement outcomes. The exchange reinforcement of a shopping episode is thus created based on former exchange experience with mutual reinforcement (Foxall, 1998; Grönroos, 1990 ) . Within the counterfeit industry in China, the bilateral circuit-type exchange network was generated as show in the Figure 6 .
FIGURE 6 HERE
This type of network is based on the bilateral contingency approach, which faces two independent sources of derived reinforcement effects from both interactors in a focal relationship. This bilateral contingency network is highly associated with those marketing systems regulated by social rules, regulations and laws. In other words, the bilateral contingency network of the counterfeit market forms a complex, closed and derived bilateral contingent effects mechanism. The dynamics of this closed system require lengthy adaptation to approach a firm and consumer state. Focal interaction must be analysed from the bilateral contingency approach and the network perspective. Their mutual exchange reinforcement must be assessed on the basis of the scope of broader exchange reinforcement effects and the behaviour setting. Practitioners should grasp the mutual exchange reinforcement events and the scope of the behaviour setting more precisely, irrespective of whether the market is regulated or unregulated.
Proposition 6. This bilaterally contingent circuit-type network is one factor that results in the coexistence of counterfeit retailers and authorised retailers.
The various marketing relationships, plus accompanying mutuality, are essential components of this bilaterally contingent circuit-type network in the counterfeit marketplace. That is, when authorised retailers choose to target only one level of market segment (e.g. a risk-averse segment), their optimal response is to accommodate counterfeit marketers as long as the latter does not threaten their target markets and in particular, only when both parties have reciprocal behaviour settings and reciprocal reinforcement. This is illustrated by existing research showing that counterfeit retailers' selling behaviour actually increases market awareness of well-known branded products. In fact, consumers draw upon both environmental cues and their own unique learning history in order to procure goods in that market place, a variety of vendors vying for the customer's business. Some of these vendors are legitimate manufacturers and retailers, others are nefarious purveyors of counterfeit copies. This analysis has revealed a relatively free-market competitive environment in operation; a competitive environment which can be summarised according to normative business criteria and strategic analytical tools.
Theoretical and Marketing Implications
Further Research
This paper has sought to study contribute to our understanding of how counterfeit marketing firms approach marketing mix strategies and marketing activities, and what interactive relationships are built between key actors in the counterfeit marketplace. The results of the case analysis suggest that the driver of the consumption process is the construction of reciprocal reinforcement and the scope of the behaviour setting, from manipulating the effective reinforcers (e.g. utilitarian, social benefits) that others can be stimulated to respond to, the scope of the behaviour settings that interactors provide one another with, and the expected reinforcing outcomes encouraging them to repetitively engage in the Based on this perspective, future research focus should be on the measurement of the extent to which the reciprocal reinforcement can stimulate consumers and other actors' responses to counterfeit goods consumption. In other words, measurement issues should be concerned with the degree and content of reciprocal reinforcement and the scope of the behaviour settings, manipulation/management of which may reduce counterfeit products' consumption.
Under the paradigm of the buyer-seller relationship, marketing management subjects such as resources strategy, product manufacture and supply flow, and buyer-seller interaction and benefit assignment with the marketplace, all involve a systematic understanding of the interactional relationships within a reciprocally reinforcing network. This investigation identifies a derived bilaterally contingent pattern network in the counterfeit marketplace.
Using this bilateral-contingent network paradigm, research can be further undertaken as follows:
firstly, more research can be conducted to clarify the reinforcement content of interactive relationships, the mechanisms of reinforcement transmission among the actors (or exchangers), the ways in which marketing firms transform their non-economic reinforcement into economic reinforcement via interaction and eventually achieve their goals; secondly, using models with identifiable reinforcing effects, researchers can vividly capture actual reciprocal interactions in a complex marketplace using a bilaterally contingent network approach; and thirdly, to illustrate the interactional reality more clearly and assess the reciprocal reinforcing relationships accurately, more studies must be performed to understand possible attrition and limitation among reciprocal interactors within a network.
Marketing implications
The preceding sections have highlighted the different roles that the consumer, the retailer and third parties (such as local government) play in contributing to counterfeiting activities. The findings show that all parties are co-responsible as each lie at one end of the balance in a bilateral circuit market network. The non-deceptive nature of counterfeit marketing is an artefact of the bilaterally contingent marketing relationships at work in the marketplace. The real question is the extent of illegitimacy. In a non-deceptive counterfeit market, counterfeit products' consumption is not necessarily bad for the authorised retailers/ distributors, third parties and consumers.
Because market competition is intensifying, it is difficult for firms to create diverse and innovative products and/or services to fulfil all levels of consumer needs based solely on their own resources and abilities. Through commercial transactions or trade negotiations, marketing firms can unify useful external resources, predict and control the operations of interactors, and can finally deliver the promised value to the market. When the authorised and counterfeit retailers are targeting different marketing segments, a large market demand and external network effects are generated. The authorised distributors have no incentive whatsoever to terminate the opportunistic counterfeit marketers because of the mutual exchange reinforcement. This is in direct contrast to the usual advice given to the authorised distributors by proponents of the price differential issues explanation to prohibit sales of counterfeit goods in a non-deceptive marketplace. There are circumstances when the firm's sustainable competitive advantage can be improved because non-deceptive counterfeit products have a positive impact on the legal version of the product. For example, the authorised distributors may want to promote regional or global brands and channel diversion as one way to achieve this.
Rather than "defend at all cost" or "develop the mass market" strategies, non-deceptive products piracy and intellectual property misappropriation should be managed by the marketing firm depending on the nature of the market and the competition. By carefully managing the mutual reinforcement events (e.g. enforcement, fines) and the scope of the behaviour setting (e.g. legal action, anti-counterfeiting technologies), marketing firms should be able to extract some of, the benefits of network externalities and derive other effects of the interactive relationship, while keeping within reasonable parameters lost sales and brand erosion. In order to determine the optimal approach at managing anti-counterfeiting efforts, the marketing firms should adjust both side derived effects of bilateral contingency relationship.
The network compositions constructed represent numerous market realities, consequently the findings of this investigation are suitable for application to diverse market firms involved in exchange and interactive activities. The marketing firms approach may be a valuable tool for exploring the complex market mechanism through which mutually beneficial cooperation can be achieved, exchanging the business resources of members and the integrating ways of a whole products value, an approach that should eventually be able to realise the common vision of the network. That is, instead of anti-counterfeiting, the authorised retailers and third parties may perhaps appropriately utilise non-deceptive counterfeit consumption as a strategy through management of behaviour setting and reinforcement events. In other words, practitioners should not ignore the derived reciprocal reinforcement and its influence; they should deploy control over behaviour settings and create reciprocal reinforcement events systematically. Table 3 ↓ 2. Credit for well-known brand products and quality 2. counterfeit retailers' selling behaviour has influenced credit of authorised retailers 2. Consumer's pursuit high social status and popular goods give authorised retailers more selling opportunities 2.Consumers' unlimited desire for social status and wellknown branded goods control the authorised retailers' reputation
